1. Introduction {#sec0001}
===============

Dating application (apps) have a variety of functions for users to match and meet others, for example based on their interest, profile, background, location, and/or other factors using functions such as location tracking, social media integration, user profiles, chatting, and so forth. Depending on the type of app, some will focus more heavily on certain functions over another. For example, geolocation-based dating apps allow users to find dates within a certain geographic area ([@bib0013], [@bib0019], [@bib0022]), and a number of dating apps have reportedly "rolled out functionality and pricing changes to help people connect more deeply without meeting in person" in the recent lockdowns due to COVID-19[1](#txtfn1){ref-type="fn"} . Popular apps such as *Tinder* allow users to restrict the range to a specified radius, but *Happn* takes this approach a step further by tracking users who have crossed paths. From there, the user can view brief descriptions, pictures or other information uploaded by the user. While this is a convenient way of connecting strangers ([@bib0019], [@bib0021]), it could make *Happn* users more vulnerable to predatory behavior, such as stalking ([@bib0012], [@bib0015], [@bib0016], [@bib0020]). In addition, it was recently reported that activities on popular dating apps appeared to have increased in the recent COVID-19 lockdowns, as more users are staying and working from home[2](#txtfn2){ref-type="fn"} . Such increased usage could have security and safety implications ([@bib0023]; [@bib0024]).

Given the popularity of dating apps and the sensitive nature of such apps, it is surprising that forensic studies of dating apps is relatively understudied in the broader mobile forensic literature ([@bib0001], [@bib0004]) (see also [Section 2](#sec0002){ref-type="sec"}). This is the gap we seek to address in this paper.

In this paper, we highlight the potential for malicious actors to uncover the personal information of other users through a forensic analysis of the app's activity on both Android and iOS devices, using both commercial forensic tools and freely available tools. To ensure repeatability and reproducibility, we describe our research methodology, which includes the creation of profiles, capturing of network traffic, acquisition of device images, and backing up of iOS devices with iTunes (see [Section 3](#sec0003){ref-type="sec"}). For example, devices are imaged if possible, and iTunes backups are utilized instead for the iOS devices that could not be jailbroken. The images and backups are then analyzed to reveal further artifacts. The findings are then reported in [Section 4](#sec0007){ref-type="sec"}. This section covers various artifacts recovered from network traffic and files left on the devices from the app. These artifacts are separated into ten different categories, whose data sources include captured network traffic, disk images from the devices, and iTunes backup data. Complications encountered during the study are discussed in [Section 5](#sec0015){ref-type="sec"}.

Next, we will revisit the extant literature relating to mobile forensics. In these related works, some focus on dating apps (one also covers *Happn*) and others taking a broader approach. The studies discuss artifact collection (from files on the device as well as from network traffic), triangulation of user locations, discovery of social relationships, and other privacy concerns.

2. Related literature {#sec0002}
=====================

The amount of literature focused on discovering forensic artifacts from both mobile dating apps and apps in general has grown gradually ([@bib0005], [@bib0008], [@bib0017]), although it pales in comparison to other areas of mobile forensics ([@bib0027], [@bib0004]; [@bib0026]; [@bib0025]). [@bib0002] demonstrated how mobile apps could broadcast personal information through wireless networks despite the encryption standards implemented by apps, such as *Grindr* (a popular dating app). By using a live detection program that takes the network activity of the previous 15 s on a device to predict the app and its activity, they were able to estimate the personal characteristics of various test personas. One was identified as most likely wealthy, gay, male and an anxiety sufferer from the traffic patterns created by opening apps such as *Grindr, M&S*, and *Anxiety Utd* -- all discovered despite the use of encryption.

[@bib0011] detected software vulnerabilities in the assets of Android dating apps -- user profile and location information, user credentials, and chat messages. By sniffing the network traffic, they were able to find a number of artifacts, such as user credentials. Four apps stored them in their shared preferences while one app stored them as a cookie, all of which were retrievable by the authors. Another was the location and distance information between two users where in some dating apps, the exact distance can be extracted from the packets. If an attacker obtains 3+ distances between his/her coordinates and the victim's, a process known as triangulation could be done to find the victim's location. In another study, [@bib0014] carried out this process on the *Feeld* app by extracting the distance between the adversary and the target, drawing a circle where the distance acted as the radius at the adversary's current coordinates, and then repeating the process at 2+ alternate locations. Once the circles were drawn, the target's accurate location was discovered.

In the realm of general mobile apps, [@bib0018] focused on acquiring forensic artifacts for a messaging app on Android and iOS devices. Specifically, by accessing both devices' system files, the following artifacts were obtained -- user credentials, non-encrypted images and videos, chats in plaintext, contacts and phone numbers, emails, and audio files. Since most of the data were not encrypted, there are privacy implications, for example should a data leakage occurs due to the use of the app. [@bib0010] also looked at messaging and social apps on iOS devices by sniffing their network traffic and found that 15 out of the 20 apps sent unencrypted or partially encrypted traffic. Some artifacts found were location data, text messages, emails, and information on searched users on with their Facebook profile links.

Another study focused specifically on the *Happn* app and how one can use it to uncover social relationships was able to de-anonymize users through triangulation and piece together details of any profile ([@bib0006]). In addition, [@bib0006] explained how an attacker could target a large population by uncovering "their daily routines, their home and work addresses, where they like to hangout on weekends, and who their friends, their relatives, and their colleagues are." They were able to accomplish this on a population of almost 10,000 *Happn* users in Rome, Italy by placing 20 test accounts in popular places in the city and then repeatedly retrieving the list of nearby users while also rearranging the accounts to pinpoint the positions of those users. By using just the data provided by *Happn* to actively track the users, the authors found that an attacker could not only uncover the target's routine or favorite places, but also use that information to discover his/her social network -- friends, colleagues, relatives, and so forth.

3. Experiment setup {#sec0003}
===================

*Happn* allows the use of a Facebook account or phone number to sign up and login and requires a recovery email address in case a user cannot login. To retrieve as many forensic artifacts as possible, four Android and four iOS mobile devices with their respective phone numbers were used to create eight profiles that were then split into four pairs of two "romantic partners." The four couples would then conduct common activity over three separate sessions, such as sending messages and rejecting other profiles.

[Tables 2](#tbl0002){ref-type="table"} and [3](#tbl0003){ref-type="table"} summarize these eight test devices and the app versions, respectively. Each pair involved a younger and older individual with some of these individuals providing an age on the dating app. This would portray a realistic scenario where many dating apps require a specific age to sign up or an individual wishes to be deceptive. The details of the profiles are shown in [Table 4](#tbl0004){ref-type="table"} . Now, the experiment workflow/setup will be explained, but is also summarized in [Fig. 2](#fig0002){ref-type="fig"}.Table 1Related literature summary.Table 1Artifact TypesMessagesImagesLocationCredentialsAuthentication tokenPersonal InformationMatchesMatches' informationStudies[@bib0002]✓[@bib0011]✓✓✓✓[@bib0014]✓✓✓✓✓✓[@bib0018]✓✓✓[@bib0010]✓✓✓✓✓[@bib0006]✓✓✓✓Table 2Test devices.Table 2DeviceOS versionModeliPhone 6siOS 12.4.1A1688iPhone 6iOS 12.4.1A1549iPhone 7iOS 11.2.2A1778iPhone 7iOS 12.1.1A1660Galaxy S6 EdgeAndroid v7.0Samsung-SM-G925AGalaxy Tab A6Android v5.1.1SM-T280Galaxy S5Android v6.0.1SM-G900PMEmu Emulator (Galaxy S7 Edge)Android v5.1.1SM-G935FTable 3*Happn* app versions.Table 3OSApp versionInstallation dateiOS9.6.208/01/199.710/30/199.811/6/19Android3.0.2208/01/1924.18.010/30/19Table 4Test profiles.Table 4NameReal ageOnline ageGenderSexual orientationUnsolicited messagesJeffrey Lamcee5823MStraightNoneSamantha Kasper20XFBisexualMultiple MessagesJoseph Jordan39XMStraightNoneDottie Harford1322FStraightMultiple messagesTrayvon Jackson63XMBisexualNoneAshley Gray18XFBisexualMultiple messagesNate Trujillo18XMBisexualNoneHaley Thomas50XFBisexualNone[^1]

3.1. Fiddler proxy {#sec0004}
------------------

In order to retrieve network traffic between the mobile devices and *Happn*'s server, Fiddler -- a web debugging proxy -- was utilized to decrypt HTTPS traffic from the iOS devices and was installed on a laptop running Windows 10. Changes were made in the Fiddler settings to allow remote connections and enable the decryption of HTTPS traffic.

Several steps were taken on the client devices to complete the decryption process. After the clients and the Fiddler server were connected to the same wireless network, the clients were configured to use Fiddler as a proxy. Each client downloaded Fiddler's root certificate from [http://ipv4.fiddler:8888](http://www.ipv4.fiddler:8888){#intrrf0001}, a web page served by the Fiddler proxy. After the certificate was installed on each client device, decrypted HTTPS traffic was visible through Fiddler. Once the setup was complete, six sessions involving common activity on the app for each profile/device were conducted, as can be seen in [Fig. 3](#fig0003){ref-type="fig"}.

While the proxy was able to decrypt traffic for iOS devices, it did not work with Android devices. As an alternative, an Android packet sniffer app, Packet Capture, was run every time there were interactions between the device and *Happn*. Packet Capture has a feature to capture traffic from a single app, making it easy to isolate activity from *Happn*. [Fig. 1](#fig0001){ref-type="fig"} shows the complete setup for the capture of network traffic.Fig. 1Device setupFig. 1Fig. 2Experiment flowFig. 2Fig. 3Sessions timelineFig. 3

3.2. Data acquisition {#sec0005}
---------------------

Besides network traffic, forensic artifacts can be found by acquiring data from the device itself. Logical images were acquired for iOS and Android through the tool, MOBILedit Forensic Express, but it was realized that the images did not contain any new or significant information. For iOS devices, iTunes backups were made after each session so that the application's property lists (plist) and SQL databases could be analyzed. The images from the MEmu emulator were stored in VMDK format on the host machine. Two VMDK files from the emulated device were found under C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microvirt\\MEmu\\MemuHyperv VMs\\MEmu. Both image files were analyzed using Autopsy and FTK Imager. The first image file contained various system partitions. The second image file contained the device's root partition. Lastly, the Samsung Galaxy tablet and iPhone 6s were jail-broken to gain root access. This will be discussed in the following section.

Logical acquisition for the Galaxy S5 was performed using *dd* with root access. The device was connected to a Windows 10 laptop via USB. *ADB* was used to install *BusyBox* on the device. This allowed for the use of *netcat* as a listener. The *netcat* listener served the output from *dd* over the network. After opening the proper port with *ADB*, a *netcat* client connection was established from the laptop. This connection resulted in the transfer of the image from the Galaxy S5 to the laptop.

All of the tools used in capturing network traffic and acquiring logical images is shown in [Table 5](#tbl0005){ref-type="table"} .Table 5Tools used.Table 5ToolVersionPurposeMOBILedit Forensic Express7.0.2.16772Logical Acquisition + AnalysisFTK6.0.3.5Analysis of MEmu VMDK ImageAutopsy4.12.0Analysis of MEmu VMDK ImageMEmu Android Emulator7.0.1Logical Acquisition + Android EmulatorReincubate iPhone Backup Extractor7.7.0.2112iTunes Backup extraction of iOS devicesplist Editor Pro2.5.0.1Analysis of plists of iOS devicesFiddler5.0.20192.25091Network Traffic Capture + Analysis for iOS devicesDB Browser for SQLite3.11.2Analysis of SQL databases of Android + iOS devicesCheckra1in0.9.5Jailbreak iOS devicePacket Capture1.7.0Network Traffic Capture + Analysis for Android devicesMiXplorer6.42.3Analysis of rooted tabletBusybox Free1.26.2-StericsonDD image extraction of Galaxy S5 with Netcat implementationTable 6Findings summary.Table 6Artifact typesiOSAndroidNetwork traffic Phone number + Email✓✓ Authentication token✓✓ User's location✓✓ Crossing location w/ match✓✓ Messages✓✓ Audiovisual files✓✓ User's profile info✓✓ Matches' profile info✓✓ Matches✓✓ Proof of user's real infoPhysical Image Phone number + Email Authentication token User's location✓ Crossing location w/ match Messages✓ Audiovisual files✓✓ User's profile info✓✓ Matches' profile info✓✓ Matches✓ Proof of user's real info✓iTunes Backups Phone number + Email Authentication token User's location✓ Crossing location w/ match Messages✓ Audiovisual files✓ User's profile info✓ Matches' profile info✓ Matches✓ Proof of user's real infoTable 7Findings + tools used.Table 7Artifact typesiOSAndroidNetwork trafficFiddlerPacket capture Phone number + Email Authentication token User's location Crossing location w/ match Messages Audiovisual files User's profile info Matches' profile info Matches Proof of user's real infoPhysical image Phone number + Email Authentication token User's locationDB Browser Crossing location w/ match MessagesDB Browser Audiovisual filesDB Browser User's profile infoDB Browser, MOBILeditMiXplorer, DB Browser, Autopsy Matches' profile infoDB BrowserMiXplorer MatchesDB BrowserDB Browser Proof of user's real infoplist Editor Pro, MOBILedit iTunes backups Phone number + Email Authentication token User's locationDB Browser Crossing location w/ match MessagesDB Browser Audiovisual filesDB Browser User's profile infoDB Browser Matches' profile infoDB Browser MatchesDB Browser Proof of User's real info

### 3.2.1. Gaining root access {#sec0006}

While it may be necessary to jailbreak the iOS device or root the Android device in order to gain root access to its system files, analysts should be aware of the implications and consequences. For example, a jailbroken or rooted device would be more susceptible to malware because it removes the restrictions placed by the manufacturer to prevent such attacks. Along the same line, the apps downloaded would have full access to the device, which may result in the device crashing. Also, depending on the tool used to perform the jailbreaking or rooting, system updates could erase the jailbreaking or rooting and the dependent apps; thus, forcing one to go through the process again [@bib0007].

The Galaxy S5 was rooted using *CF-Auto-Root* in conjunction with *Samsung Odin*. These tools were used from a Windows 10 laptop with the device connected via USB. After the device was rooted, *SuperSU* was installed to manage root privilege access. This allowed for the extension of root privileges to a terminal emulator application, enabling privileged command execution directly on the device. *Android Debug Bridge (ADB)* was also used to gain shell access to the device from the laptop. Regardless of the method used, the *su* command was used to elevate privileges.

The Galaxy Tab A6 was rooted using *Odin 3.10.7, TWRP*, and *SuperSU*. Odin allowed the device to start up from TWRP. To boot with TWRP the user has to press Volume up + Home + Power, although this varies for other devices. TWRP allowed us to flash the SuperSU file which granted root privilege access.

The MEmu emulator came with root access by default. Unlike the Galaxy S5, *SuperSU* was not installed. However, it was still possible to open a shell on the device via *ADB* and run *su* to log in as the root user.

To jailbreak the iPhone 6s, a semi-tethered app called *checkra1n* was used. This works for iPhone 5s -- iPhone X and the iOS versions 12.3 and up. At the time of this paper, it was only compatible with Mac OS. Because of this, a Macbook Air laptop was used to install checkra1in through Cydia Impactor. After following the instructions within the app, the iPhone was successfully jail-broken. To gain access to the system files, OpenSSH was utilized. From a Windows 10 laptop, Powershell was run to ssh into the phone by typing in the following command: *ssh root\@ip address of phone*. To login, the default password was *alpine*, which then gave successful access into the phone's system files. The password was then changed to prevent potential hacking of the device.

4. Findings {#sec0007}
===========

Having captured the traffic between the devices and *Happn* server and analyzing their images, an adequate amount of forensic artifacts was found for both Android and iOS. The artifacts found off the network traffic, logical and physical images for Android will be discussed first. The second section will go over the artifacts for iOS, which includes those from the network traffic, logical and physical images, and the iTunes backups.

4.1. Android {#sec0008}
------------

### 4.1.1. Network traffic {#sec0009}

Network traffic from the Android devices was obtained using the Packet Capture app. Several types of artifacts were located in the captured traffic including text-based messages, profile information, audio messages, and profile pictures.

User data was requested through the /api/users/user_id endpoint. User information was returned in JSON format. Some of the information included the user's first name, age, school, profile pictures, and distance. The response data also included an entry titled *last_meet_position*. This entry contained latitude and longitude values along with timestamps. One example was observed where the Galaxy S5 (with Trayvon logged in) requested Ashley's data. The GPS coordinates landed just outside of the building where the devices with the two profiles were situated. The response data also contains an entry called *my_relations*. In the same response, the *my_relations* entry included a sub-entry called *mutual* with a timestamp of Ashley and Trayvon's match time.

The client devices requested *Happn* conversation data using HTTP GET requests to the /api/conversations/conversation_id. The server sent back JSON responses with the conversation contents and metadata. The response data was filled with separate entries for each message. Each message contained the ID of the sending user, message contents (text, audio, or a Spotify link). Sender information was also provided for each message, including the user's first name, age, and profile pictures. A sample HTTP response with conversation data is seen in [Fig. 4](#fig0004){ref-type="fig"} .Fig. 4Conversation JSON dataFig. 4Fig. 5Jeffrey Lamcee's authentication token.Fig. 5Fig. 6MessagesFig. 6

Each of the profiles sent audio messages in addition to text. There was no functionality in the app allowing users to download the recordings, only a simple playback feature. However, several of these audio messages were located through the Packet Capture app and successfully downloaded. The *Happn* app pulled the audio messages using HTTP GET requests to an API endpoint with the format /media/audio/:id. The ID values were referenced in the JSON responses from /api/conversations in the message field.

### 4.1.2. Physical image artifacts {#sec0010}

Within the rooted Android tablet were some interesting artifacts. With MiXplorer, the root file directory was accessed and information was pulled out from both *Happn* and Packet Capture. Under /data/data/com.ftw_and_co. *Happn* /databases there was information regarding profile data of the user and others. The database file contained text referring to all the users that the Samantha profile crossed paths with, including users that Samantha did not match with. The information includes: age, profile biography, gender, whether the user has sent a like, and URLs that link to pictures of the user. All of this data would allow someone to easily build a profile on a user or track them down. With the images, it would be possible to do a reverse image search and find the user on other social media platforms.

Under /data/data/com.ftw_and_co.*Happn* /shared\_ prefs/device_attributes.xml, information about the user's device can be seen. This includes OS type and version number, hardware make and model, *Happn* id, mobile token, and whether Bluetooth is enabled or not. In this case we can tell what device Samantha is using and find ways to exploit her device knowing its specifications. This information could paint a picture for different ways an attacker could access a device.

*Happn* stores cached photos on the device under /data/data/com.ftw_and_co\_ *Happn* /cache/http-picasso. Results were inconsistent among the different devices, but the Galaxy S5 that was used with Trayvon Jackson's profile contained a variety of images. Some of the images were simply application assets, but profile pictures appeared as well. Trayvon's picture was cached along with those of Haley, Ashley, and a real user of the app. media platforms.

4.2. iOS {#sec0011}
--------

### 4.2.1. Network traffic {#sec0012}

An abundance of data was found when sniffing the network traffic between the *Happn* app and its server. *Happn* allows a person to sign up or login through either Facebook or a phone number. If a user signs up with a phone number, a verification code is sent to that user via SMS on the provided phone number. The user then enters the verification code into the app to complete the sign up process. There were two packets found in relation to this process. The first is titled */api/verification-sms* and contains the phone number to which the verification code was sent. The other, */api/verification-sms/code* contains the code itself. Additionally, a packet called */connect/oauth/token* was found. This contains the access token for the user along with his/her associated user ID all in plain-text. What was found was that the access token value never changed for each session. As it is used to authorize access and then as a credential Auth0, an attacker could use the token to gain access to the target's account.

The next group of artifacts revolves around users' profiles. A profile on *Happn* mainly consists of preferences that must be filled out, such as partying, cooking, relationship, etc. Other information such as a short biography or occupation are optional. When looking at the captured traffic for the test profile, Jeffrey Lamcee, a packet named */api/users/user_id* gave all profile information on the user, including those mentioned, personal data (age, birthday, registration date), and URLs to his profile pictures. In *api/suggested-users*, the same data was found on profiles that had been rejected and liked, with some having a "my_relationship" value that states if they had been rejected. One significant artifact was coordinates on the last meeting time between Jeffrey Lamcee and the other user(s). These artifacts were repeatedly found in other packets as well, including */api/v1/opportunities* and those that contained a specific user ID. Concerning the test user, his coordinates, city, and country were listed in another iteration of */api/users/user_id*.

Messages had been sent between the pairs of test devices. In the case of Jeffrey Lamcee, he had been matched with Samantha Kasper. Messages that spanned the three sessions were found mainly in */api/conversations/conversation_id* where text, audio, and Spotify song links could be seen, as well as who sent what. There are specific packets dedicated to audio messages or Spotify songs and while the latter contains album and artist information and a playable preview, audio messages could not be played. The two test profiles also blocked each other at certain points. Certain packets with Jeffrey's user ID contained indication of blocking Samantha, including *Message = user blocked* and the reason why her account was blocked. When the user was unblocked, another packet contained *Message = user unblocked*.

There is a feature in the app that allows a user to explore a map to see in which area paths had been crossed with other "*Happn*ers." To see if network artifacts could be obtained from this, the test accounts moved over large areas of the city and zoomed in on certain regions/counties. While no data on other profiles leaked, what did was that various areas of the city that had been explored on the map could be read. This was seen as significant because it could tell an attacker about the target's geographic preferences and/or general living location.

### 4.2.2. iTunes backup artifacts {#sec0013}

Three iTunes backups from each session were made for each iPhone. The property lists and SQL databases were analyzed and while the former did not have many significant artifacts, the opposite was true for the databases. *Happn* has two main SQL databases to store data: Hdata.db and happSightAnalytics.db. It is the first file that contains user data. There are a number of tables within this database that are of interest, starting with ZFLHPDEVICE and ZFLHPRECOVERYINFORMATION. The first table contains coordinates of the user's location at the time of app use, country, language, and city while the second has the user's email address, which *Happn* uses to log a user in when an issue is run into. ZFLHPIMAGE contains URLS to other users' profile pictures, but also has Z_PK values that when matched with a PROFILEPICTURE value in the ZFLHPPROFILEITEM table, will connect user's name to his/her photos(s). Continuing, ZFLHPMEDIA shows the sent audio messages that while including URLs, were still not playable. Messages between the test accounts are found in ZFLHPMESSAGE where text, audio, and Spotify messages can be seen. The table also has a ZSENDER value that is associated with a certain user -- which is consistent throughout the tables and sessions -- and a ZDATESENT value that when decoded tells the date the message was sent. As mentioned before, the ZFLHPPROFILEITEM table can be used to connect user to profile image. What it also contains is various values about the potential profiles a user rejects or likes, including first and last name, job, and workplace. It should be noted however that some of these values were NULL for an unknown reason that is not associated with whether a profile was rejected or liked. Additionally, ZFLHPUSERREJECTED has a list of those users who were rejected. The profile preferences of the test user were found in ZFLHPNTRAITSINGLEOBJECTANSWER and lastly, ZFLHPREPORT shows when a profile is blocked with that user's associated value and the reason for blocking.

### 4.2.3. Physical image artifacts {#sec0014}

Once root access was gained in the iPhone 6s, some additional artifacts could be found. An interesting one relates to the Hdata.db. After the last session, the account was "paused" to see if any artifacts could still be retrieved. When looking at the database afterwards, it appeared empty and only began storing data when the account was logged back on and activity was conducted. Another interesting artifact is one that could indicate if an individual created a false profile. The device name was found in /private/var/root/Library/Lockdown/data_ark.plist, a property list that has data on the device and account holder. In the case of Jeffrey Lamcee, which was depicted as a false profile, the *DeviceName* value was "John's iPhone." If the name of the device holder is different from the app profile on it, that could indicate the creation of a fake online profile.

Other artifacts include the following. Jeffrey Lamcee's two profile pictures could be downloaded and viewed from /private/var/mobile/Media/DCIM/100APPLE. One log named *Mobile_log.0* states in which container the application bundle (in the case of *Happn*, it is fr.ftw-and-co.whoozer) gets stored, allowing one with access to pinpoint that exact directory and obtain the app's data. *Com.apple.springboard.plist* tells which apps are on a device's home screen and on the iPhone 6s, *Happn*'s bundle name was found as one of the apps. Lastly, /private/var/mobile/Library/CoreDuet/Knowledge/ contains a *KnowledgeC.db* database that stores data on multiple processes that run in an iOS device, including application usage ([@bib0009]). When looking at one of its tables, ZOBJECT, app usage can be viewed in correspondence with a certain application, its stream name, UUID, and start date, among other values. Therefore, it could be seen that fr.ftw-and-co.whoozer was used on December 6, the day Jeffrey Lamcee's account was unpaused.

5. Limitations {#sec0015}
==============

During the experiment, there were some attributes of the app and issues with the tools used that limit the findings. For iOS, there were two. One involved the *Happn* app update to 9.7.0. It was found that with the update one phone number could not be used for different accounts. This was not an issue before because two of the test devices had been signed up with the same phone number. If a used phone number is associated with a new account, *Happn* will override the original account with the newly-created one. Despite the new implementation providing a more secure form of authentication, the test profiles containing the same phone number -- Ashley Gray and Hayley Thomas -- had to be recreated after having created forensic artifacts. The second issue was that SQL database data from November 7 for two of the profiles -- Jeffrey Lamcee and Dottie Harford -- contained no data, despite there being data for the same app database for the dates, October 30, 2019, and November 6, 2019. The reason for this is because the November 7, 2019, session involved "pausing" the accounts, essentially logging the users out. When this occurs, *Happn* does not store the previous data in its database. The tablet device containing Samantha Kasper's information was unable to be used in conjunction with Autopsy. The program was unable to obtain information from the root directory. To solve this issue, we used MiXplorer to view said files.

As for the Android devices, three limitations were found. The first is that a SIM card is not needed to login the app with a phone number. For an iOS device, a user could not sign up for a *Happn* account with his/her phone number unless a SIM card was present. This was not an obstacle for the tested Android device. The second issue is that one phone number can be tied to different accounts. This can be seen as an authentication hole through which a user can set up various profiles based on a single phone number. Lastly, during the capturing of the Android devices' network traffic, the Packet Capture app could not work when running on the Galaxy S6. Because of this, the associated profile's -- Joseph Jordan -- app activity could not be captured.

It should also be highlighted that the image acquisition tool, MOBILedit Forensic Express, did not acquire app or system data that hadn't already been found by the other tools for both iOS and Android devices. This could be due to the fact that its application analysis feature does not currently support the *Happn* app and therefore could only retrieve a limited amount of information.

6. Conclusion and future research {#sec0016}
=================================

In this study, mobile device forensics and network analysis on the *Happn* dating app were conducted. The goal was to identify artifacts that may pertain to sensitive user data, using both iOS and Android devices along with eight (8) varying user profiles with diverse backgrounds throughout the investigation. Each device ran different versions of the iOS and Android *Happn* dating app. The information we were able to recover was found through the use of many tools such as FTK Imager and Packet Capture. What was found was self-revealing information of the user and profiles they interacted with, information such as exact location with longitude and latitude, URL links containing all photos uploaded by the user and others they interacted with, access tokens, user Ids, and profile information posted by users.

On a broader note, the mobile forensics 'space' can be seen as a race, not only to keep up with device (i.e. hardware) and software releases by providers (e.g. new app version or addition of new features / functions), but also from software and hardware modifications made by end users, particularly serious and organized criminals, to complicate or prevent the collection and analysis of digital evidence. Hence, future mobile forensic tools and/or approaches should be designed in such a way that it can be readily adapted to the latest mobile device and app technologies. This is essential given the ongoing and rapid change characteristic of mobile computing technology and to ensure the digital forensic practitioner and researcher communities have timely expertise and insights to their potential use in criminal activities, particularly in serious and organized criminal activities. Thus, it is important to keep a watchful brief on the threat landscape, such as the following:1.How are dating apps, and more generally mobile apps used in the commission and execution of crimes and incidents that require digital investigations?2.What types of evidential data (e.g. data-at-rest and data-in-transit) are available, considering the advanced security features and anti-forensic techniques that could be utilized, particularly by serious and organized criminals?3.What techniques can the digital forensic investigators use to legally gain access to the identified evidential data?

Future agenda also include extending this research to other popular dating apps, and presenting a categorization of potential forensic artifacts that could be recovered from the analysis of these popular dating apps. This will allow the forensic community to know what forensic artifacts they should be looking for in the examination of such dating apps. In addition, the findings from the categorization can also help inform the design of future mobile forensic tools, for example to circumvent future security measures without compromising the evidence's integrity.

It is also important to balance the need for a secure mobile / telecommunications system and the rights of individuals to privacy against the need to protect the community from criminal activities, particularly serious and organized crimes, and cyber security interests. This is an issue that has serious implications on the ability of governments to protect their citizens. However, it remains an under-researched area due to the interdisciplinary challenges specific to this research. Hence, there is also a need for mobile app developers to place a greater focus on the right to individual privacy, for example by following existing industry best practices for designing Secure mobile apps[3](#txtfn3){ref-type="fn"} .
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